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9 Financial Liberalization: The 
Korean Experience 
Won-Am Park 
9.1 Introduction 
Korea has achieved remarkable economic growth through an export- 
oriented growth strategy but has had pervasive government intervention in its 
credit markets. Korea’s high growth was attained through the government’s 
active role in financing industrial development. Policy loans made at preferen- 
tial interest rates and direct credit control were the main tools used by the gov- 
ernment. 
Although it is certain that government intervention in the credit market 
played a role in accelerating Korean development, this strategy has not been 
without significant costs, borne mainly by financial institutions and depositors. 
Financial repression created an inefficient banking system, a weak corporate 
financial structure, and high inflation tax burdens. The benefits and costs of 
heavy government intervention in the financial sector have been, and still are, 
hotly debated topics in Korea. 
This paper explores changes in financial markets and financial policies and 
their effects on and consequences for Korea since financial deregulation 
started in the early 1980s. Finding the causes for changes in financial markets 
and assessing the impact of financial policies is a very difficult task. The causes 
and consequences of any specific financial policy are often so multifarious and 
intertwined that we cannot easily identify them. Nonetheless, this paper will 
investigate Korea’s experiences with financial deregulation since the early 
1980s. 
Section 9.2 provides an overview of Korea’s financial deregulatory process 
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since the early 1980s and its future plans. Section 9.3 investigates the effects 
of financial deregulation on the structure of the financial system, behavior of 
financial intermediaries, and monetary and exchange rate policies. Section 9.4 
tests capital mobility in Korea by focusing on saving-investment correlations 
and interest parity conditions. Section 9.5 analyzes the movements of Korea’s 
nominal and real exchange rates. Concluding remarks are provided in section 
9.6. 
9.2 Overview of Korea’s Financial Deregulation since the Early 1980s 
When Korea embarked on a policy of outward-oriented growth in the early 
1960s, the government began to intervene heavily in financial markets to direct 
insufficient domestic savings toward investment in export industries. The gov- 
ernment’s intervention was intensified in the 1970s as its industrial policy 
shifted to the heavy and chemical industry drive. Bank interest rates were con- 
trolled at below the market-clearing level. Credit was also allocated by lending 
directives set up by the government. 
Toward the end of the 1970s, the government’s promotion of heavy and 
chemical industries gave rise to severe distortions in resource allocations and 
to internal and external imbalances in the economy. To make things worse, the 
oil price hike, social and political turmoil, and a bad rice crop during 1979-80 
brought about serious stagflation in the Korean economy. This poor perfor- 
mance and great imbalances in the Korean economy provided momentum for 
reevaluating the industrial and financial policies implemented in the 1970s and 
for pursuing a new policy in the 1980s. 
The new policy package aimed at achieving economic balance through eco- 
nomic liberalization. To correct the overinvestment in heavy and chemical in- 
dustries and distortions created by the strong protectionist policies in the 
1970s, the government had respect for the market mechanism and competition 
and as a result limited government intervention. The import liberalization ratio 
rose from 68.6 percent in 1979 to 91.6 percent in 1986. The average nominal 
tariff rate for all commodities declined from 35.7 percent in 1978 to 18.1 per- 
cent by 1988. The incentive system for strategic industries, such as preferential 
credit and tax treatment, was realigned into a system of more indirect and func- 
tional support. The tax reform of 1981 substantially reduced the scope of spe- 
cial tax treatment for key industries. This new industrial incentive system cul- 
minated in the Industrial Development Law effective from July 1986 that 
defined some areas of market failure in which the government might intervene 
for industrial rationalization. The financial deregulatory process that we will 
review was only part of the new policy package.’ 
1. See Nam (1992), Cho and Kim (1993), and Park (1994) for a recent review of Korea’s finan- 
cial deregulation and financial opening. 
249 Financial Liberalization: The Korean Experience 
9.2. I Domestic Financial Deregulation 
Financial deregulation commenced with the removal of various restrictions 
on bank management and the privatization of commercial bank ownership in 
the early 1980s. Regulations on commercial banks in the spheres of the organi- 
zation, budget, branching, and business practices were greatly loosened. Dur- 
ing 1981-83, the government sold its shares in all nationwide commercial 
banks. To prevent bank ownership from being concentrated among Korea’s 
large conglomerates, the chaebol, ownership by a single shareholder was re- 
stricted to 8 percent of the total. The government also chartered two joint- 
venture commercial banks with Korean and foreign partners and loosened reg- 
ulations on chartering nonbank financial institutions (NBFIs) such as invest- 
ment, mutual savings, and finance companies. In addition, it has continued to 
broaden and diversify services supplied by financial institutions. 
The government’s management of credit and interest rates has improved. 
Although the government continued to set ceilings for bank loans and deposits, 
it decided to switch from direct credit controls to indirect ones. Most preferen- 
tial interest rates applied to various policy loans were abolished in June 1982, 
and further policy loans were restrained. In early 1984, financial institutions 
were allowed to set their own lending rates within a given range according to 
the creditworthiness of the borrowers. This action has been followed by a series 
of measures deregulating interest rates in the organized financial sector. Such 
measures include the lifting of the upper limit on call rates in 1984, the decon- 
trol of yields on convertible bonds and debentures with bank payment guaran- 
tees in 1985, and the freeing of interest rates on certificates of deposit (CDs) 
and issuing rates for debentures with bank payment guarantees and financial 
debentures issued by deposit money banks in 1986. 
This series of interest rate deregulations culminated in the decontrol of bank 
and nonbank lending rates in December 1988. These measures were a signifi- 
cant step toward financial deregulation. As interest rates rose after they were 
decontrolled, however, the government revoked the plan. Furthermore, eco- 
nomic slowdown and labor disputes in 1989 hindered progressive liberaliza- 
tion toward the end of the 1980s. Not until August 1991 did the government 
release the four-phase schedule for the full liberalization of interest rates in the 
domestic financial market. 
The restructuring of the financial industry has been of concern as the new 
financial instruments that cross between banking and securities promote com- 
petition among financial intermediaries. Korea has not had any formal legal 
restrictions against a universal banking system since the decision was dele- 
gated to the Monetary Operation Board, but Korea generally has maintained a 
specialized banking system. Banks are limited in dual operations, but some 
are already in the securities business and involved in short-term financing 
through the acquisition of subsidiaries. In March 1991, Korea’s eight short- 
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term finance companies were changed into two banks and five securities com- 
panies. Table 9.1 summarizes major events in Korea’s financial deregulation 
since the early 1980s. 
9.2.2 Financial Market Opening 
Domestic financial deregulation since the early 1980s has been accompa- 
nied by a gradualist approach to financial opening. While deregulation in the 
domestic financial market proceeded faster than financial opening in the first 
half of the 1980s, the latter went faster in the latter half of the 1980s because 
the current account ran surpluses during 1986-89 after chronic deficits in the 
previous years. 
Prior to Korea’s current account surplus in 1986, some measures were im- 
plemented to open domestic financial markets gradually. The basket-peg ex- 
change rate system was adopted in 1980. The forward exchange market was 
Table 9.1 
Financial liberalization program 
Introduction of corporate paper 1981 
Privatization of nationwide commercial banks 198 1-83 
Abolition of beneficial interest rates on policy loans 1982 
Alleviation of government intervention in the internal operation of banks 1984 
Introduction of negotiable CDs 1984 
Introduction of a band for bank loan rates 1984 
Indirect opening of the stock market through the Korea Fund 1984 
Introduction of cash management accounts by short-term finance companies 1987 
Introduction of bond management funds by securities companies 1987 
Relaxation of entry barriers to financial industry, including banks, life 
1988 
Opening of the life insurance industry to foreign firms 1988 
Announcement of phased deposit and loan rate deregulation Dec. 1988 
Opening of the securities industry to foreign firms 1991 
Announcement of a four-step interest rate liberalization plan 1991 
Conversion of some short-term finance companies to securities companies or 
banks 1991 
Opening of purchase of individual equity stocks on the Korea Stock Exchange 
to foreign investors 1992 
Foreign exchange and capital account liberalization 
Switch to a basket-peg exchange rate system from a dollar-peg 1980 
Foreign exchange forward transaction implemented 1981 
Interest rate swap allowed 1984 
Switch to a negative system in foreign direct investment policies 1984 
Issuance of convertible bonds (CBs), warrant bonds (WBs), and depository 
receipts (DRs) 1985 
Financial futures allowed 1987 
Transition to an IMF article VIII country 1988 
Foreign exchange call market established 1989 
Switch to the Market Average Exchange Rate System 1990 
Switch to a negative system in foreign exchange management 1992 
Highlights of Korea’s Financial Deregulation since the Early 1980s 
insurance, lease, and investment tmst 
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created in 1980 as well. Interest and currency swaps were introduced in 1984. 
The Korea Fund, a closed-end mutual fund for foreigners who want to invest 
in Korean stocks, was established and listed on the New York Stock Exchange 
in 1984. 
The current account surpluses in 1986-89 provided further impetus to de- 
regulate foreign exchange transactions in areas such as position management, 
documentation requirements, and the international use of the won. By deregu- 
lating a substantial portion of current account transactions, Korea accepted the 
obligations of the IMFS article VIII in November 1988. Furthermore, invest- 
ments by foreigners in domestic securities were permitted and facilitated 
through the issuing of beneficiary certificates for foreigners and equity-linked 
overseas securities (CBs, WBs and DRs) by domestic firms, as well as through 
the additional establishment of overseas country funds-the Korea Europe 
Fund in 1987 and the Korea Asia Fund in 1991. The watershed was the intro- 
duction in March 1990 of the so-called Market Average Exchange Rate System 
for the determination of exchange rates, whereby rates were allowed to fluctu- 
ate daily in accordance with the changes in market supply and demand. 
In promoting liberalization of capital account transactions, the government 
sought first to deregulate foreign direct investment in Korea and Korean direct 
investment in foreign countries. Since 1984, when the positive list system for 
approving foreign direct investment was replaced by a negative list system, 
the government has progressively liberalized Korea’s foreign direct investment 
system by shortening the list of nonpermissible categories of business for for- 
eign investments. 
The significant step toward financial opening was taken in 1991. Effective 
from January 1992, foreigners are allowed to purchase Korean stocks, up to 3 
percent of the outstanding shares of each company for each individual; no 
more than 10 percent of a company may be foreign-owned, however. The gov- 
ernment also authorized the operation of foreign securities companies in Ko- 
rea. In addition, the Foreign Exchange Management Act was revised in 1991 
so that the positive system, whereby all foreign exchange activities are initially 
deemed prohibited unless stipulated otherwise, has been replaced by a negative 
system which permits in principle all activities except those specified. Table 
9.1 also summarizes major events in the financial market opening since the 
early 1980s. 
9.2.3 Blueprint for the Liberalization and Opening of the Financial Sector 
The current account surplus in the latter half of the 1980s not only stimu- 
lated financial opening but also aroused trade and financial conflicts with the 
United States. Accusing Korea of “manipulating” its exchange rate, the United 
States demanded that Korea advance its trade and financial liberalization pro- 
grams and make the liberalization programs more transparent. Korea and the 
United States, to settle pending issues in their financial conflicts, agreed in 
August 1989 to hold financial policy talks as needed. Having had several dis- 
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cussions since 1989, both parties agreed to set out the three-stage Blueprint 
for the Liberalization and Opening of the Financial Sector. The first-stage and 
second-stage blueprints were announced in March and June 1992, respectively. 
Extending these, the third-stage blueprint was announced in June 1993. 
The third-stage blueprint covers crucial areas such as interest rate liberaliza- 
tion, control of bank loans to chaebols, short-term finance, and foreign ex- 
change and capital account liberalization. Table 9.2 outlines the third-stage 
blueprint, which will be the cornerstone for Korea’s financial liberalization. It 
aims to achieve substantial liberalization of Korea’s financial sector by 1997. 
9.3 Effects of Financial Liberalization 
Korea’s financial liberalization since the early 1980s can be characterized as 
cautious and slow in terms of its order and speed. The influence of government 
Table 9.2 Third-Stage Blueprint for the Liberalization and Opening of the 
Financial Sector (announced June 1993) 
Schedule Items 
Phase 1 1. 
(1993) 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5.  
6. 
Phase I1 1. 
( 1994-95) _. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7 
7. 
8. 
9. 
Phase I11 I. 
( 1996-97) 
L. 
Liberalize all bank and nonbank lending rates (except for policy loans) and 
long-term deposits over two-year maturity. 
Issue Monetary Stabilization Bonds and government bonds of close to 
market interest rates. 
Operate M2 targets flexibly. 
Liberalize call markets. 
Widen the daily won-dollar trading margin from 0.8 to I .0 percent. 
Switch to the notification system for foreign direct investment into Korea. 
Liberalize all lending rates and rates for short-term marketable instruments. 
Establish indirect monetary controls. 
Deregulate loans to large conglomerates. 
Develop short-term financial markets. 
Further widen the daily won-dollar trading margin. 
Further ease requirements for underlying documentation prior to foreign 
exchange transactions. 
Expand limits on foreign investment in the stock market. 
Allow foreign participation in primary markets for some bonds. 
Ease requirements for opening branches of foreign securities companies. 
Liberalize all deposit rates except for demand deposits (allow moncy market 
certificates and money market funds). 
Utilize open market operations as main monetary policy tool. 
3. Operate the Loans Management System as a prudential regulation. 
4. Introduce free-floating exchange rate system. 
5. Eliminate requirements for underlying documentation for the usual foreign 
6. Allow foreign borrowing through commercial loans. 
7. Allow foreign financial institutions to hold stock of domestic banks. 
exchange transactions. 
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diminished gradually in financial markets as its industrial policies were not 
easily separated from financial policies. The cautious approach to financial 
opening was preferred to prevent external factors from creating additional dis- 
turbances in the process of domestic financial liberalization. Despite the slow 
pace of financial liberalization, Korea’s financial market and financial policies 
have changed greatly since the early 1980s. 
9.3.1 Changing Structure of the Financial System 
The financial liberalization since the early 1980s stimulated financial inter- 
mediation as shown in figure 9.1. As economies grow, there is a tendency for 
the ratio of financial institutions’ assets to GNP to increase. However, financial 
deepening stagnated in the 1970s as the ratio of domestic financial assets to 
GNP rose only modestly from 2 12 percent in 1970 to 240 percent in 1980. In 
contrast, the ratio doubled during 1980-93 with financial liberalization. 
Financial deepening since the early 1980s has been driven by the growth of 
NBFIs. While the ratio of banks’ financial assets to GNP has stagnated since 
the early 1980s, the ratio of the NBFI sector’s financial assets to GNP has 
jumped remarkably (see table 9.3). The rapid growth of NBFIs can also be 
confirmed by the composition of financial savings in table 9.4. The share of 
bank deposits among the total financial savings declined from 46 percent in 
1980 to 24 percent in October 1993. In contrast, the share of nonbank deposits 
increased from 38 percent to 68 percent during the same period. 
The growth of NBFIs was possible because they operated under relatively 
free conditions with respect to interest rate control, burden of policy loans, 
entry barriers, and ownership regulation in order to absorb informal market 
funds into the organized financial market. The growth of NBFIs contributed to 
deepening the financial market, but it resulted in another disequilibrium in the 
financial market, that is, lack of competition between banks and nonbanks and 
slow progress toward a universal banking system. 
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Fig. 9.1 Trend of financial deepening 
Source; Economic Srutistics Yearbook (Seoul: Bank of Korea, various issues). 
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Table 9.3 Ratio of Financial Assets to GNP (%) 
Deposit Life Insurance Nonfinancial 
Financial Money and Pension Sector 
Year Sector" Banks Funds Othelh (domestic) 
1975 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
I990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
72.7 
100.6 
107.6 
122.6 
129.2 
134.0 
144.9 
145.1 
150.7 
157.5 
183.7 
191.5 
198.2 
213.1 
226.3 
53.3 
64.0 
64.8 
71.8 
73.2 
71.3 
74.8 
71.9 
70.5 
67.7 
73.5 
74.8 
75.0 
78.8 
79.6 
2.7 
6.0 
7.1 
8.5 
10.0 
11.5 
12.8 
14.7 
16.4 
18.4 
21.4 
23.3 
24.4 
25.8 
26.5 
16.7 
30.6 
35.7 
42.3 
46.0 
51.2 
57.3 
58.5 
63.8 
71.4 
88.8 
93.4 
98.8 
108.5 
120.2 
136.4 
139.7 
147.6 
165.2 
165.7 
170.3 
172.8 
177.0 
185.4 
186.4 
212.0 
2 14.9 
214.2 
223.5 
234.2 
Sources; Flow of Funds (Seoul: Bank of Korea, various issues); Narional Accounts (Seoul: Bank 
of Korea, various issues). 
"Excludes the Bank of Korea. 
'Includes nonmonetary financial institutions and securities companies. 
Table 9.4 Composition of Financial Savings (period end; %) 
Period 
1972 
1975 
1980 
1985 
1990 
1991 
1992 
Oct. 1993 
Bank Time and 
Savings Deposits 
Including CDsa 
70.0 (82.2) 
60.2 (65.8) 
45.9 (51.5) 
36.3 (42.3) 
25.6 (38.8) 
25.3 (38.9) 
24.7 (40.9) 
23.6 (42.0) 
Nonbank 
Deposits 
22.2 
27.6 
37.8 
53.6 
60.3 
59.5 
64.2 
67.8 
Securities 
13.2 
15.6 
21.8 
24.4 
29.9 
30. I 
27.9 
26.5 
Intersectoral 
Transactions 
-5.4 
-3.4 
-5.4 
- 14.3 
- 15.8 
- 15.0 
- 16.7 
- 17.9 
Source: Fiscal nnd Financial Srarisrics (Seoul: Ministry of Finance, various issues). 
aNumbers in parentheses are bank time and savings deposits including both CDs and money in 
trust (the latter being formally classified as nonbank deposits). 
9.3.2 Behavior of Financial Intermediaries 
Deregulation also affected the behavior of financial institutions. First, fi- 
nancial deregulation resulted in the reduction of policy loan burdens, causing 
the share of policy loans in total domestic credit to decline markedly from 47 
percent in 1980 to 25 percent in 1991 (table 9.5). This fall was mainly achieved 
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Table 9.5 Share of Policy Loans (ratio to domestic credit: %) 
Monetary Institutions 
Credit to Foreign Other 
Government KDB and Currency Trade Housing Financial 
Year Subtotal Funds KEXIM Loans Financing Loans Institutions Total 
1973 
I975 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
I990 
1991 
48.2 
40.9 
49.1 
45.7 
40.3 
41.2 
40.7 
39.3 
40.6 
45.7 
46.4 
46.4 
46.3 
41.9 
~~ 
5.3 
3.5 
3.0 
2.9 
3.0 
3.2 
3.5 
3.5 
3.6 
3.5 
3.6 
3.8 
3.6 
3.7 
3.4 6.6 11.5 3.1 52.8 
1.8 8.6 8.5 2.8 52.4 
1.5 15.5 10.3 5.6 43.9 
1.5 12.6 10.0 4.2 41.1 
1 .o 11.5 8.3 5.7 38.8 
1 .o 9.8 8.2 6.3 36.6 
1 .o 8.7 7.7 6.4 31.7 
0.9 7.7 7.4 5.9 30.2 
1 .o 7.5 7.0 5.5 24.1 
5.8 9.7 4.2 5.5 20.5 
7.9 8.9 1.9 8.2 17.3 
7.9 8.2 1.7 6.6 14.1 
7.7 8.5 2.0 7.0 12.7 
6.9 8.8 1.9 7.1 12.0 
49.3 
43.5 
47.4 
44.1 
39.7 
39.4 
36.8 
35.3 
33. I 
33.6 
31.9 
29.2 
27.8 
24.9 
Source; Korean Economic Zndicators (Seoul: National Statistical Office, various issues) 
by the swift development of NBFIs such as investment and insurance institu- 
tions whose loans were not directed by the government and the shrinkage of 
some NBFIs such as development institutions whose loans are mostly policy- 
related. In contrast, the portion of policy loans by deposit money banks in total 
domestic credit showed a slight decrease. That figure declined from 49 percent 
in 1980 to 39 percent in 1985, but rose again to 46 percent during the latter 
half of the 1980s. The jump in the share of policy loans during 1987-90 stems 
from increased credit to development institutions such as the Korea Develop- 
ment Bank (KDB) and the Korea Export Import Bank (KEXIM) and increased 
agricultural and housing loans, which more than offset the drastic decline of 
export financing. 
Second, while financial deregulation encourages banks to manage their 
assets and liabilities more carefully, we do not find any significant changes in 
the composition of bank assets as shown in table 9.6. The loans and discounts 
of banks continued to occupy almost 50 percent of total assets which exclude 
acceptances and guarantees, securities about 10 percent, and so forth. The sec- 
toral composition of bank loans extended each year also did not change distinc- 
tively in the way that is expected with financial deregulation (table 9.7). Al- 
though more than half of all bank loans extended went to the business sector, 
there is no clear evidence that the business sector received a larger or smaller 
share of bank loans with the progress in financial liberalization. Rather, the 
sectoral composition varied each year according to macroeconomic conditions 
and financial policies. 
Table 9.6 Accounts of Deposit Money Banks (%) 
Domestic Assets 
Year Cash Due Securities 
1970 3.7 14.9 2.4 
1975 3.7 14.4 2.6 
1980 8.0 7.1 7.8 
1981 11.0 4.7 9.8 
1982 10.5 7.2 8.3 
1983 9.3 3.7 10.9 
1984 12.0 5.3 10.2 
1985 9.9 9.9 6.8 
1986 8.4 9.0 7.9 
1987 11.7 8.3 8.3 
1988 13.6 8.9 8.1 
1989 12.3 6.8 8.5 
1990 14.9 5.5 9. I 
1991 13.2 5.7 9.6 
1992 10.2 5.9 10.3 
1993 7.5 6.0 11.6 
Loans in 
Loans and Foreign 
Discounts Currency 
Foreign 
Assets 
49.3 6.9 
41.8 4.9 
46.4 9.9 
46.8 8.1 
48.0 7.5 
48.9 6.3 
47.0 5.3 
49.4 4.8 
51.3 4.9 
47.8 6.1 
46.6 5.4 
50. I 5.2 
46.7 5.2 
47.8 5.5 
48.7 4.9 
49.5 4.5 
13.8 
9.4 
11.4 
10.4 
8.3 
8.4 
7.9 
7.4 
6.5 
5.8 
5.6 
4.3 
4.3 
4.4 
4.8 
5.6 
Other 
9.0 
23. I 
9.5 
9.2 
10.1 
12.4 
12.3 
11.9 
12.1 
12.0 
11.7 
12.8 
14.3 
13.9 
15.3 
15.3 
Total 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
~ 
Source: Monthly Bulletin (Seoul: Bank of Korea, various issues). 
Note: Figures are ratios to total assets excluding acceptances and guarantees. 
Table 9.7 Sectoral Composition of Bank Loans Extended (%) 
Year Financial Sector Government Business Individuals 
1970 
1975 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
I984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
0.0 
1.5 
2.5 
6.9 
I .4 
1.1 
4.9 
-0.9 
-0.5 
11.4 
12.9 
31.9 
-6.3 
-1.1 
14.7 
3.1 
0.6 
3.7 
0.8 
0.0 
2.2 
4.2 
0.9 
3.4 
-1.2 
- 1.0 
-1.2 
0.7 
2.7 
1.8 
1 .o 
1.6 
63.5 
68. I 
63.4 
52.5 
61.9 
49.8 
66.9 
76.3 
75.9 
49.0 
52.5 
40.6 
60.9 
66.2 
57.8 
64.9 
35.9 
26.7 
33. I 
40.6 
34.4 
44.9 
27.3 
21.1 
25.8 
40.6 
35.8 
26.8 
42.6 
33. I 
26.4 
30.4 
Source: Flow of Funds (Seoul: Bank of Korca, various issues). 
Nore: Figures are ratios to the total bank loans made each year. 
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Third, financial deregulation did not bring about a rapid expansion in lend- 
ing, as shown in figure 9.2. This result is in contrast with experiences of other 
countries in which bank loans grew rapidly as the activities of financial institu- 
tions were decontrolled. The boom-bust cycles due to eased credit with finan- 
cial liberalization are well documented even in the case of advanced countries 
such as the Scandinavian countries (Akerholm 1994) and Australia (Lowe 
1994). 
The mechanism for boom-bust cycles is as follows. Financial liberalization 
eases credit via the removal of most quantitative restrictions on bank lending, 
interest rate decontrol, the relaxation of control over foreign capital inflows, 
and a scramble for market share among financial intermediaries. The eased 
credit goes to households as well as to businesses. The boom in lending, which 
happens to coincide with the boom in the economy, soon turns into an asset 
boom as lax credit is used to finance consumption and asset purchases, which 
in turn can be used as collateral against which to borrow. An excessive con- 
sumption boom and soaring asset prices make an economy highly vulnerable 
to adverse changes in economic conditions. A credit-supported boom must end 
in crisis as the authorities adopt tight monetary policy to control rampant infla- 
tion and the asset bubble explodes. The longer and more substantial the boom 
is, the more deep and damaging the crisis. 
In Korea, there was close correlation between the growth in financial loans 
and increases in land prices. Thus credit-supported boom-bust cycles after fi- 
nancial liberalization could have been possible, if the financial repression of 
the 1970s had been followed by rapid and drastic financial liberalization in the 
early 1980s. In fact, the cautious and gradual approach to financial liberaliza- 
tion hindered financial intermediaries from engaging in excessive loans to 
households or investments in asset markets. The actual asset market boom in 
Korea in the latter half of the 1980s is attributable to the yen and won apprecia- 
tion vis-&-,is the US. dollar rather than to credit expansion.2 
9.3.3 Monetary Policy 
The Korean government supplied a large amount of loans to priority sectors 
to sustain high growth and at the same time tried to control inflationary pres- 
sure caused by these loans. To achieve the conflicting goals of economic 
growth and inflation control, the government had to intervene directly in fi- 
nancial markets by using direct interest rate controls, preferential credit to pri- 
ority sectors, high reserve requirements, and other direct controls on monetary 
aggregates and domestic credit. 
Until the 1970s, the underdeveloped financial market limited the effective- 
ness of indirect monetary controls. The rediscount policy was ineffective be- 
cause rediscounts were almost automatically approved and supplied at prefer- 
ential rates. The reserve requirements were quite high until 1980, but the high 
2. See Park and Park (1994) for a discussion of this issue. 
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Fig. 9.2 Loans and land price 
Sources: Economic Statistics Yearbook (Seoul: Bank of Korea, various issues); Lond Price Trends 
(Seoul: Ministry of Construction, various issues). 
reserve requirement ratio was not effective because the reserve deficiencies of 
the banks were replenished with their borrowings from the central bank. In- 
stead of controlling monetary expansion, the high reserve requirements de- 
creased the profitability of banks. Open market operations, the most important 
tool for indirect monetary control, were carried out in a limited way because 
the fiscal deficits were financed through money creation rather than through 
bond issues and, moreover, interest rates for bonds were significantly below 
the market-clearing level. 
Financial liberalization brought with it important changes in monetary pol- 
icy from direct monetary controls to indirect ones. First, in 1982, the authori- 
ties replaced direct control over bank lending with an indirect reserve control 
system. Since 1982, there has been no formal direct control of bank credit 
except for measures to restrict loans to large conglomerates. 
Second, efforts were made to restore such traditional central bank policies 
as the rediscount policy, reserve requirement policy, and open market opera- 
tions. The emphasis of the rediscount policy has been on setting the rediscount 
ratios and changing the eligibility criteria of bills presented to the Bank of 
Korea. The reserve requirement ratio was lowered markedly during 1980-82 
because the authorities recognized the ineffectiveness of the high reserve re- 
quirement policy and the increased financial burdens of banks caused thereby. 
The authorities also tried to use open market operations more frequently by 
financing fiscal deficits more through bond issues and offering Monetary Sta- 
bilization Bonds at interest rates close to market rates.3 
Third, even with financial liberalization, the authorities have been using M2 
growth as the intermediate target variable since 1979. The practice of monetary 
targets had both good and bad aspects in Korea. Monetary targeting certainly 
3. See Kang (1993) and Ro (1993) for the details of Korea’s monetary policy 
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served to curb inflationary pressure when the economy was on the verge of 
overheating. At the same time, however, rigid monetary targets encouraged the 
government to rely on direct monetary controls. Sometimes the M2 amount 
was managed by adjusting the balance sheets of financial institutions. 
The progress toward indirect monetary controls was interrupted by huge cur- 
rent account surpluses in the latter half of the 1980s, since the monetary expan- 
sion through the foreign sector created additional burdens in controlling the 
money supply (see table 9.8). On one hand, the excessive money supply neces- 
sitated more rapid foreign exchange and capital account liberalization and even 
a floating exchange rate system. Thus monetary policies in the latter half of the 
1980s were concerned mainly with the balance of payments and exchange 
rates. The current account surpluses accelerated the progress in financial open- 
ing and exchange rate floating, leading to the won’s appreciation. 
On the other hand, the monetary expansion from the foreign sector hindered 
the deregulation of domestic financial markets. For instance, the measure de- 
regulating lending rates in December 1988 was revoked quickly for fear of a 
rise in interest rates in the process of monetary contraction. Also the Bank of 
Korea has had to issue such large amounts of Monetary Stabilization Bonds as 
to assign them to NBFIs at interest rates below market rates. Furthermore, the 
money growth targets became more important than any other indicators that 
could be used to assess domestic economic conditions and the stance of pol- 
icies. 
9.3.4 Exchange Rate Policy 
Korea maintained a de facto dollar-peg system until 1980 although the sys- 
tem was officially named the unified floating exchange rate system. Under this 
system, Korea’s real exchange rate tended to appreciate. Recognizing the ad- 
verse effects of real appreciation on its trade account, Korea adopted the Multi- 
ple Currency Basket Peg System in February 1980. The new system was insti- 
Table 9.8 Sectoral Increases in the M2 Supply (end of year; billion won) 
Government Private External 
Year Credit Credit Sector Other Total 
I985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
I990 
1991 
I992 
1993 
40 
170 
- 1,656 
-2,174 
- 1,993 
- 1,458 
778 
-271 
-1,919 
6,462 
6,765 
6,115 
8,642 
16,871 
19,068 
20,840 
14,060 
18,136 
- 1,595 
2,424 
9,030 
10,212 
2,365 
118 
-3,117 
4,066 
5,397 
- 1,047 
-4,091 
-7,043 
-8,021 
-7,543 
-7,660 
-3,463 
-5,342 
-5,654 
3,860 
5,268 
6,446 
8,659 
9,699 
10,070 
15,038 
12,513 
15,961 
~ 
Source: Monthly Bulletin (Seoul: Bank of Korea, various issues). 
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tuted to stabilize the real effective exchange rate of the won. Indeed, the real 
effective exchange rate has tended to depreciate since 1980 (figure 9.3). Over- 
all, it could be said that Korea’s exchange rate policy evolved from a nominal 
anchor approach in the 1970s into a real target approach in the 1980s. 
The real target approach helped to reduce the current account deficit and the 
huge external debt in the early 1980s. Many international institutions, such as 
the International Monetary Fund, supported Korea’s real depreciation because 
they thought that real depreciation was required to prevent financial liberaliza- 
tion from being stalled in its beginning stages by the expanded current account 
deficits and the aggravated external debt problem. However, once the current 
account began to show surpluses starting in 1986 due mainly to enormous yen 
appreciation, the situation developed in a different way. Many international 
institutions including the U.S. Treasury accused Korea of “manipulating” its 
exchange rates. In response to foreign pressure and an excess supply of foreign 
exchange, real appreciation of the won occurred during 1988-90. 
Korea adopted a new exchange rate system called the Market Average Ex- 
change Rate System in March 1990 to make exchange rates better reflect mar- 
ket fundamentals. Under the new system, the won-dollar exchange rate 
changes to reflect the demand and supply of foreign exchanges, albeit within a 
daily trading margin. The daily won-dollar trading margins have been widened 
several times, from the initial 0.4 percent above and below the base exchange 
rate to 1.0 percent in October 1993. Under the Market Average Exchange Rate 
System, the real effective exchange rate of the won tended to depreciate. 
Figure 9.3 also shows that Korea was lucky to face sustained improvement 
in the terms of trade during its financial deregulation. In fact, the improvement 
in the terms of trade was substantial enough to offset the won’s real depreci- 
ation. 
Fig. 9.3 Exchange rates and terms of trade 
Source: ln ternahzal  Financial Smisrics (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, vari- 
ous issues). 
Nore: Dottcd curve shows won’s real effective exchange rate with Korea’s seven major trading 
partners (the United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and the Neth- 
erlands). Highcr values mean real depreciation. 
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9.4 Tests of Capital Mobility in Korea 
As reviewed in the previous section, Korea’s financial liberalization was ex- 
tended to financial opening to make it more comprehensive. The package of 
financial market opening policies includes the liberalizing of foreign exchange 
transactions, opening of domestic capital markets, and floating of exchange 
rates. 
Table 9.9 shows developments in Korea’s capital account since the early 
1980s. The capital account was in surplus in the first half of the 1980s to ac- 
commodate the large current account deficit. Public and commercial loans 
were the major source of capital inflows during this period. As the current 
account registered massive surpluses in the latter half of the 1980s, however, 
public and commercial loans served as the major source of capital outflows 
causing capital account deficits. Entering the 1990s, the capital account once 
again began to register surpluses as capital account liberalization brought in 
large portfolio investments from abroad. As stated in section 9.2, foreigners 
were allowed to invest in the Korean stock market starting in 1992. 
Table 9.9 raises at least two questions regarding Korea’s capital mobility. 
One is how open Korea’s financial markets are in a weak or strong sense. The 
other is whether the degree of financial openness increased with financial liber- 
alization even though Korea’s financial markets are not completely opened. 
The casual answers to the two questions can be inferred from figure 9.4. Since 
ex post differences in won returns between won deposits in Korea (measured 
by corporate bond yields) and dollar deposits abroad (measured by LIBOR) 
are substantial, one can easily conclude that uncovered interest parity does not 
hold in Korea and consequently that Korea’s financial markets are not com- 
pletely ~ p e n e d . ~  Regarding degree, Korea’s financial opening seemed to deteri- 
orate in the latter half of the 1980s as ex post differences in won currency 
returns between domestic and foreign assets widened but the capital account 
registered net outflows during the same period. This stems from the huge cur- 
rent account surplus which in turn led to the won’s appreciation vis-B-vis the 
.U.S. dollar and active capital account policy for net outflows, such as advance 
payments of foreign loans. 
Rather than depending on casual empiricism, this section intends to measure 
and test international capital mobility in Korea. One can measure capital mo- 
bility by investigating asset price arbitrage conditions, risk diversification, 
4. The interest rate differentials here incorporate the problem of measurement errors. The re- 
turns on won deposits are represented by the yield on corporate bonds of three-year maturity while 
the won currency returns on dollar deposits are represented by the three-month LIBOR plus the 
won’s annual depreciation vis-8-vis the U.S. dollar. These measurement errors were inevitable 
because (uncontrolled) three-month interbank loan rates are not available in a long series and 
corporate bond yields used to represent market interest rates in Korea. A one-year horizon for the 
won’s depreciation was chosen arbitrarily by considering the difference in maturity of Korea’s 
corporate bonds and dollar deposits at the London interbank market. 
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Table 9.9 Korea's Capital Account (annual average; million U.S. dollars) 
Item 1981-85 1986-90 I99 1-93 
~ 
Current account 
Capital account 
Long-term 
Liabilities 
Public loans 
Commercial loans 
Direct investments 
Portfolio investments 
Assets (increase, -) 
Liabilities 
Assets (increase, -) 
Short-term 
-2,232 
1,596 
1.702 
2,250 
98 I 
-81 
117 
31s 
- 540 
- 106 
- 133 
27 
6,301 
- 1,807 
-2,673 
-1,771 
-907 
- 741 
676 
131 
-902 
866 
1,043 
-176 
-4,269 
6.440 
6,739 
7,328 
- 1,001 
-720 
728 
6,646 
-589 
-299 
499 
-799 
Source: Bdance of Pavments Statistics (Seoul: Bank of Korea, various issues) 
1980 1982 19% 1986 1988 1990 1992 
-a'... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  ! . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Fig. 9.4 
Nore: Korea's corporate bond yield - dollar LIBOR. 
Interest rate differentials and capital flows in Korea 
saving-investment correlations, or effectiveness of sterilized invention.' 
Among them, this section concentrates on the saving-investment correlations 
and asset price arbitrage conditions. 
9.4.1 Saving-Investment Correlations 
Feldstein and Horioka ( 1  980) proposed saving-investment correlations as a 
barometer of capital mobility. They argued that if domestic savings are free to 
flow to their most productive uses in the world, a change in domestic savings 
will seldom affect domestic investment. However, this approach raised many 
questions concerning interpretation and econometri.c estimation (Obstfeld 
1993; Montiel 1993). 
5. A good survey on capital mobility is provided in Obstfeld (1993) for advanced countries and 
Montiel ( I  993) for developing countries. 
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Despite many challenges to the Feldstein-Horioka approach, saving- 
investment correlations are still one of the ways to measure international capi- 
tal mobility. Table 9.10 presents the regression results of investment ratios with 
respect to saving ratios in Korea, using quarterly data for 1980.1-1992.4. This 
time-series estimation has the crucial limitation that it captures only the short- 
run relationship between national saving and domestic investment without ex- 
plaining the true long-run relationship. The long-run relationship can be cap- 
tured by estimating cross-sectional data averaged over a sufficiently long pe- 
riod. Despite these limitations, the saving-investment correlation coefficient 
was estimated to be small or even slightly negative in table 9.10. 
Although the estimates are insignificant, little correlation between saving 
and investment might suggest high capital mobility in Korea. However, the 
interpretation and econometric problems involving the Feldstein-Horioka ap- 
proach could be applied to Korea’s saving-investment correlations. Consider- 
ing that Korea was able to finance its very high investment with foreign funds, 
one may obtain small estimates even if Korea’s financial markets are not suffi- 
ciently integrated with world financial markets. The time-series results of only 
small correlations between national savings and domestic investment should 
not be interpreted to mean that only small fractions of increases in national 
savings remain at home or that the saving retention coefficient is low in Korea. 
9.4.2 Interest Rate Parity Conditions 
The degree of financial integration has typically been measured by the ex- 
tent to which asset price arbitrage takes place. Numerous studies have exam- 
ined covered or uncovered interest rate parity conditions, but only a few have 
investigated the Korean case. This lack of interest seems to stem from the ob- 
servation that uncovered interest parity does not hold in Korea, as shown in 
figure 9.4. 
Rather than testing whether uncovered interest parity holds, Reisen and 
Yeches (1991) directly estimated the degree of capital mobility following the 
method of Haque and Montiel (1990), which takes the influence of foreign 
Table 9.10 Saving-Investment Correlation in Korea 
Period Level-OLS Level-IV Difference-OLS 
1980-92 0.15 (1.85) 0.18 (2.12) -0.07 (-1.20) 
1980-85 -0.22 (-1.89) -0.26 (-2.13) -0.23 (- 1.63) 
1986-92 0.12 (0.31) 0.45 (0.96) -0.09 (-0.60) 
Notes: “Level” estimates are based on the OLS regression (W), = (Y + p ( S / Y J ,  + u,. IVs are ratio 
of government consumption to GNP. “Difference” estimates are based on the OLS regression 
A(UY), = (Y + pA(S/V), + Au,. Seasonal dummies are included. Numbers in parentheses are f- 
values. 
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interest rates on domestic interest rates as a barometer of capital mobility. Rei- 
sen and Yeches (1991) show that the degree of capital mobility was low and 
declined gradually in the second half of the 1980s in Korea. Their results were 
challenged by Jwa (1994), who shows that their results could change de- 
pending on how one specifies the counterfactual interest rates in the absence 
of capital mobility. On the other hand, Faruqee (1991) obtained the same re- 
sults as Reisen and Yeches (199 1) by employing the autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity (ARCH) technique of Engle ( 1982). 
We also examine Korea’s capital mobility by applying the ARCH technique 
to interest rate differentials between domestic and foreign assets. Using 
monthly data for Korea’s three-year corporate bond yields and dollar LIBOR 
for three-month deposits over January 1980-December 1993, the ARIMA 
(l,l,O) specification was chosen as the appropriate time-series representation 
for the interest rate differentials. To correct for conditional heteroskedasticity, 
an ARCH three-lag model was implemented. The results are contained in table 
9.1 1 and figure 9.5. 
Figure 9.5 shows that the conditional variance of shocks to interest rate par- 
ity declined drastically after it peaked in 1982. But it rose again during 1988- 
89, indicating that the degree of Korea’s capital mobility declined to a certain 
degree toward the end of the 1980s. The results are little affected by whether 
the expected rate of the won’s depreciation vis-8-vis the U S .  dollar is assumed 
under perfect foresight to be the actual depreciation rate or the won-dollar 
exchange rate follows a random walk (expected rate of the won’s depreciation 
is zero). Thus we can conclude on the basis of the ARCH test on interest parity 
conditions that, although Korea’s capital mobility increased significantly in the 
latter half of the 1980s compared to the early 1980s, it declined more or less 
in the latter half of the 1980s compared to the period of 1983-86. 
Table 9.11 ARCH Estimation for Interest Rate Differentials 
(model: ARIMA ( l , l , O ) )  
ARCH Lag 
i - i * -  (log S,,,, - log S,)h 0.10 0.43 0.20 0.43 0.32 0.06 
j - i* -0.01 0.38 0.21 0.61 0.17 0.21 
(2.57) (9.58) (11.74) (5.97) (5.63) (6.19) 
(-0.14) (4.63) (3.95) (3.31) (1.42) (2.14) 
Nore: Numbers in parentheses are t-values. 
’rd, interest rate differentials; i, Korea’s corporate bond yields (three-year maturity); i*, dollar 
LIBOR (three-month deposits); S, won-dollar exchange rate. 
hOne-year horizon for the won’s depreciation has been chosen arbitrarily considering the difference 
in maturity of Korea’s corporate bonds and dollar deposits at the London interbank market. 
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A 
B 
Fig. 9.5 
interest difference in won currency; ( B )  nominal interest differentials 
Deviations from interest rate parity (ARCH variance): (A)  ex-post 
9.5 Korea’s Nominal and Real Exchange Rate 
As shown in figure 9.3, Korea’s nominal and real exchange rates have fluc- 
tuated under different regimes since financial deregulation began in the early 
1980s. In this section, we present a very simple model to explain the move- 
ments of Korea’s real exchange rate and also pay attention to the volatility of 
the won-dollar exchange rate under the different regimes of the basket-peg and 
market average rate systems. 
9.5.1 A Model for Korea’s Real Exchange Rate 
We formulate a two-sector general equilibrium model to explain changes in 
Korea’s real exchange rate, particularly under the Multiple Currency Basket 
Peg System during 1980-89. The model is modified from that of Calvo and 
Rodriguez (1977) and much simpler than that of Edwards (1988). The model 
assumes a variant of a dual exchange market, where the official exchange rate 
is separated from the market exchange rate. For simplicity, the model assumes 
ful l  employment, purchasing power parity, rational expectations, and two 
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assets of domestic and foreign money. We further assume that real transactions 
take place at the official exchange rate and financial transactions take place at 
the market exchange rate. 
The real exchange rate (q )  is defined by the relative price of tradable goods 
(EPT', for E the official exchange rate and PT' the foreign currency price of 
traded goods) and home goods (pH): 
Production ( Y )  and consumption (C) for both goods are specified as func- 
tions of the real exchange rate (q)  and real wealth (a): 
YT = YT (41, y ;  > 0; 
Y H  = Y"(q), Y! < 0; 
cr = c-'(q,a), c,' < 0, cg > 0; 
C' = P ( q ,  a) ,  q > 0, C,l > 0; 
( 2 )  
where a subscript denotes differentiation with respect to that variable. 
money (M) and foreign money (F): 
The real wealth of the public in terms of tradable goods comprises domestic 
(3) 
where 6 represents the market exchange rate, rn = M/E, and p = WE. 
relationship between the real wealth of the public and the real exchange rate: 
(4) 
We assume that domestic money changes according to changes in interna- 
tional reserves or the current account balance, which is more likely in the 
Korean case of a foreign exchange concentration system: 
Equilibrium in the market for home goods (P = P) requires a negative 
a = V(q), v, < 0. 
( 5 )  M = EPT* (YT-CT) = EP'tf'(a), f, < 0. 
The demand for each asset depends on the expected relative rates of return 
on the two monies: 
The system can be represented by the state variables of the real balance m 
and the difference between the market exchange rates and the official exchange 
rate p. Figure 9.6 portrays the phase diagram. When m = 0, equation ( 5 )  deter- 
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P 
Fig. 9.6 Impact of money increase and won appreciation 
mines the unique steady state value of real wealth at a. We know from equation 
(3) that P'*ii = rn + pF. Thus the riz = 0 locus is downward sloping. The p = 
0 locus is upward sloping from equation (6). The saddle path should be upward 
sloping in figure 9.6. 
We now consider the impact of domestic monetary expansion and nominal 
appreciation of the domestic money using figure 9.6. Either the increased sup- 
ply or the nominal appreciation of domestic money raises the real balance of 
domestic money. The market exchange rate depreciates immediately to point 
A on the saddle path, thereby increasing real wealth and causing real apprecia- 
tion if the official exchange rate does not adjust. 
Figure 9.7 illustrates the impact of an increase in the foreign currency price 
of traded goods (PT*). With an increase in PT*, m = 0 shifts upward. The market 
exchange rate depreciates immediately to point B on the new saddle path. As 
the economy moves toward the new steady state, the market exchange rate 
continues to depreciate, but the official real exchange rate starts to appreciate. 
Although this exercise uncovers many interesting points related to changes in 
the foreign price of traded goods, it has a crucial limitation in that the model 
assumes the law of one price for traded goods or no changes in the terms of 
trade. Once the model is extended to the three-sector model of exportables, 
importables, and nontradables (Edwards 1988), then the shift of the m = 0 
locus depends on how much the production and consumption of traded goods 
are affected by changes in the terms of trade. Thus the initial impact of changes 
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P 
Fig. 9.7 
fiscal expansion 
in the terms of trade on the real exchange rate are generally uncertain (Edwards 
and van Wijnbergen 1987). The same conclusion can be reached in the case of 
tariff changes. 
Figure 9.7 can also be used to show the impact of increased government 
spending. As government expenditures give rise to additional demand for 
traded goods and increases in domestic credit, the steady state is achieved with 
real appreciation. Thus steady state real wealth (a) must increase, shifting the 
m = 0 locus upward. With increases in government spending, the real exchange 
rate appreciates immediately. 
9.5.2 
Impact of an increase in foreign currency price of traded goods and 
Determinants of Korea’s Real Exchange Rate 
According to the model of the real exchange that was presented in  section 
9.5. I ,  the movement of the real exchange rate shows saddle-path stability. In 
the short run, the real exchange rate is affected by both real and monetary 
variables, but in the long run only the real variable affects the real exchange 
rate. Dynamic changes of the real exchange rate could be formulated as 
follows: 
(7) 
where 8 is the coefficient for the adjustment speed, q: equilibrium real ex- 
change rate, and x, initial disturbance. According to equation (7), the impact of 
the monetary disturbances x, must disappear in the long run. But in the estima- 
tion we do not emphasize the long-run neutral effects of monetary determi- 
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nants for the real exchange rate because the monetary and real determinants 
are correlated and because the impact of monetary disturbances can last a long 
time if monetary disturbances occur when the actual real exchange rate devi- 
ates greatly from the equilibrium level. Thus the estimation equation runs as 
follows: 
log REER, = p, + p, log TOT, + p, log GEDP, + p, log TFF, 
(8) + p, RGDP, + p, CAP, + ( 1  - 0) log REER,-, 
+ P,RM2,-, + &REX, + P,REFX, , 
where REER is the won’s real effective exchange rate with Korea’s seven major 
trading partners (the United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, 
France, Canada, and the Netherlands). We have chosen terms of trade (TOT), 
ratio of government consumption to GDP (GEDP), tariff (TFF), real GDP 
growth (RGDP), and capital account balance (CAP) as real determinants. M2 
growth (RM2), the won’s depreciation against the U.S. dollar (REX), and the 
dollar’s depreciation against Korea’s seven major trading partners (REFX) are 
the monetary determinants for real exchange. 
Table 9.12 shows the estimation results. The unique features in Korea’s real 
exchange rate adjustments are in order. First, the terms of trade improvement 
or the tariff increase caused real depreciation in the 1980s. This result contrasts 
with experiences of other developing countries in which a terms of trade im- 
provement or a tariff increase induced real appreciation. Second, the real ap- 
preciation impact of real GDP growth, representing the Ricardo-Balassa ef- 
Table 9.12 Determinants for Korea’s Real Effective Exchange Rate, 
1980.1-1989.4 
Variable OLS IV” 
Constant 
log TOT 
log GEDP 
log TFF 
RGDP 
CAP 
log REER-, 
R M Z ,  
REX 
REFX 
R= 
D- W 
1.40 (2.44) 
0.14 (1.73) 
-0.19 (-3.24) 
0.11 (3.08) 
-0.17 (-1.06) 
-0.015 (-3.09) 
0.36 (2.98) 
-0.10 (-1.29) 
0.16 (1.69) 
-0.60 (-4.35) 
0.98 
1.70 
0.64 (0.83) 
0.15 (1.77) 
-0.16 (-2.45) 
0.09 (2.26) 
-0.02 (-0.10) 
-0.012 (-1.75) 
0.55 (3.22) 
0.25 (2.19) 
-0.37 (-1.84) 
-0.08 (-1.00) 
0.98 
1.75 
~ 
Notes Seasonal dummies are included RGDP, RM2, REX, and REFX are the ratios, not the 
percentages CAP is in billion U S dollars Numbers In parentheses are r-values 
dThe instrumental variables are the constant, seasonal dummies, four lags of each explanatory 
variable except for TFF and REFX, and log TFF 
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fects of real growth, was not significant in Korea, quite contrary to 
expectations. Third, monetary and fiscal expansion and capital inflows caused 
real appreciation as expected. Last, 10 percent nominal depreciation of the 
won vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar was estimated to have caused real depreciation 
of 2 percent in the current quarter and 4 percent within one year under the 
Multiple Currency Basket Peg System in the 1980s. 
With the institution of the Market Average Exchange Rate System, the nomi- 
nal exchange rate better reflects the market conditions. Accordingly, the rele- 
vance of the model diminishes as the official rate is not separated from the 
market rate. Considering these aspects, we reestimated equation (8) without 
REX variables over 1980.1-1992.4. But the qualitative results were unaffected 
when we assumed that the won-dollar exchange rate is determined by other 
real and monetary factors. 
9.5.3 Exchange Rate Volatility 
As financial markets are gradually opened and the volume of capital flows 
increase under the floating regime of the Market Average Exchange Rate Sys- 
tem, it is generally expected that exchange rate volatility will increase com- 
pared to that under the basket-peg regime. To compare exchange rate volatility 
between the two different regimes, we applied the ARCH technique to the 
monthly won-dollar exchange rate. The ARIMA (l,l,O) model with ARCH 
four lag was chosen, respectively, to investigate exchange rate movement dur- 
ing the basket-peg period of March 1980-February 1990 and the market aver- 
age period of March 1990-December 1993. Quite surprisingly, figure 9.8 
shows that won-dollar exchange rate volatility declined under the market aver- 
age system when measured either by movements of ARIMA residuals or by 
the conditional variance of ARIMA residuals. 
One might interpret this result as evidence that under the Market Average 
Exchange Rate System the Bank of Korea intervened in the foreign exchange 
market in order to prevent capital flows from appreciating the won (Park 1994). 
On the other hand, the less volatile movements of dollar-yen exchange rates 
during 1990-93 may be one reason for the less volatile movements of won- 
dollar exchange rates during the same period. In the latter case, the less volatile 
movements of won-dollar exchange rates do not necessarily imply less free- 
floating won-dollar exchange rates. 
9.6 Concluding Remarks 
Korea’s financial deregulation since the early 1980s has brought about great 
changes in the financial market and in financial policies. This paper has re- 
viewed the deregulatory process and examined the effects of financial liberal- 
ization. Despite a series of deregulatory measures, Korea’s financial market 
still has structural problems and is expected to face difficulties when the mar- 
ket is fully liberalized. 
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residuals; (B)  ARCH variances 
ARCH variance in won-dollar exchange rate: (A) ARIMA ( l , l ,O)  
Since domestic financial liberalization was mostly based on the deregulation 
of NBFIs, the reform of the banking sector is still an urgent goal. A gradual 
shift to a universal banking system seems inevitable to promote competition 
among financial institutions and to enhance the efficiency of Korea's financial 
markets. 
Both the test of capital mobility and the investigation of Korea's nominal 
and real exchange rates revealed that Korea still has a long way to go toward 
the goals of free mobility of capital and floating of exchange rates. Although 
Korea's cautious approach to financial liberalization succeeded in avoiding the 
unexpected pitfalls of deregulation and in reaping good results, efforts must 
yet be made to further deregulate the domestic financial market and increase 
the scope of financial opening. 
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Comment Shin-ichi Fukuda 
Won-Am Park has written an interesting paper. After surveying Korea’s finan- 
cial deregulatory process since the early 1980s, the paper empirically examines 
the effects of Korean financial deregulation on the financial structure, capital 
mobility, and exchange rates. The paper is informative and contains a lot of 
interesting results on the Korean financial market liberalization. I have three 
comments. 
My first comment is on the interpretation of saving-investment correlations 
in Korea. Using quarterly time-series data from 1980 to 1992, Park estimates 
Feldstein-Horioka-type equations which regress investment ratios on saving 
ratios. His result is striking because it shows little correlation between saving 
and investment. If we follow the Feldstein-Horioka-type interpretation, this 
weak correlation implies high official capital mobility in Korea in the 1980s. 
However, as Park notes, this interpretation is probably not correct. 
One possible interpretation is that the weak correlation was caused by high 
capital inflows from foreign countries but not by capital outflows to foreign 
countries. This interpretation might be partly true because regressions for dif- 
ferent sample periods showed that saving-investment correlation was lower 
when the capital account was in surplus than when it was in deficit. However, 
I think that this paradoxical correlation comes from short-term current account 
fluctuations. By the statistical identity, low correlation between saving ratios 
and investment ratios implies that domestic investment has a strong negative 
correlation with the current account. Since high investment usually implies a 
boom in the economy and a boom in the economy implies the rise of imports, 
it is quite possible that low correlation between saving and investment comes 
from a high negative correlation between a high national output level and cur- 
rent account surplus. 
My second comment is on the empirical study of interest rate parity condi- 
tions. The paper first looks at interest rate differentials between domestic and 
foreign assets and then applies the autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic- 
ity (ARCH) technique to examine the degree of Korea’s capital mobility. The 
estimation result of the ARCH model shows that the conditional variance of 
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shocks to interest parity declined after 1982 but rose again during 1988-89. 
The paper interprets this result as indicating that the degree of Korea’s capital 
mobility declined at the end of the 1980s. However, I am skeptical about this 
conclusion. In fact, when I look at figure 9.4, I find a sharp structural change 
at the end of the 1980s. That is, figure 9.4 clearly shows that at the end of the 
1980s, interest rate differentials dropped sharply from 20 to -20 percent. I 
think that the rise of conditional variance in the ARCH model during this pe- 
riod is caused by this sharp drop of interest rate differentials. 
My final comment is on the similarity between the Japanese and Korean 
experiences with controls on cross-border capital flows. In Japan, the liberal- 
ization of international capital controls happened in the 1970s. Let me briefly 
summarize several characteristics of Japan’s experience during the liberaliza- 
tion process. First, the process of capital market liberalization was not mono- 
tone. In Japan, regulations that were relaxed were reregulated again several 
times. The main reason for this reregulation was current account fluctuation. 
That is, current account deficits (surpluses) led to more restrictions on capital 
outflow (inflow), which were then relaxed when the current account turned to 
surplus (deficit). Second, Japan’s economic environment in the late 1970s was 
helpful for capital market liberalization. In this period, huge budget deficits 
created the need to develop a market for government bonds. This led to the 
liberalization of many domestic interest rates and helped to establish a precon- 
dition for free international capital movements. In addition, except for the two 
oil shock periods, Japan was starting to record large structural current account 
surpluses. These surpluses relatively reduced the governments’ concern about 
the effects of capital account opening on the balance of payments. Third, there 
was political pressure from the United States to open Japanese markets. This 
so-called gai-atsu accelerated the capital market liberalization in Japan. I think 
that contrasting these Japanese experiences with Korean experiences may pro- 
vide some interesting lessons for understanding the process of capital market 
liberalization in Korea. 
Comment HUW Pill 
Park’s very interesting and informative paper describes the twin processes of 
financial liberalization and financial opening in Korea and the interactions be- 
tween them. In the light of the earlier failed liberalization attempt of the mid- 
1960s, this program is shown to have been both gradual and cautious. Some- 
thing akin to McKinnon’s “optimal” order of economic liberalization was fol- 
lowed; fiscal stabilization preceded deregulation of the domestic banking sys- 
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tem and capital markets, which, in turn, preceded the opening of the capital 
account of the balance of payments. 
The paper also attempts to measure the degree of “financial openness” on a 
number of criteria. Somewhat surprisingly given the descriptive section of the 
paper, it is suggested that capital mobility through Korea was reduced in the 
latter part of the 1980s despite the liberalization program. 
The paper’s tenor is to suggest that the Korean liberalization program, al- 
though only partial, should be judged successful. The comments offered are in 
the form of assessing the success of the program and wondering how ex- 
portable it may be to other countries. 
Park notes that the role of directed credit and other “financially repressive” 
measures in the Korean development process is the subject of considerable 
ongoing controversy. It has been argued that “a little financial repression may 
be a good thing,” citing the Korean experience as an example. The paper re- 
mains agnostic on this issue. 
However, it is difficult to assess the success or otherwise of the program if 
one does not take a stand on this issue. Liberalization has not led to loss of 
macroeconomic control-as has been common in other countries and pre- 
viously in Korea-because of the gradualism of the program adopted. Yet one 
can only assess the optimality of the program if one can compare this benefit 
with the cost of reaching the desired liberalized state less rapidly than may 
have been possible. 
The paper discusses only the financial consequences of liberalization. There 
is no assessment of the real effects. Has the program been successful in allocat- 
ing resources more efficiently? Has it improved the growth potential or perfor- 
mance of the real economy? Such an assessment is required to genuinely eval- 
uate whether the program has been successful. 
Moreover, it is unclear what the desired liberalized state is. The paper notes 
that deregulation of the banking system and the capital account of the balance 
of payments remains partial. These have been the problematic issues in many 
other countries. Are the potential gains from such liberalization worth the risk 
of incurring potentially large costs? Is Korea voluntarily extending liberaliza- 
tion to these areas or is it being coerced into so doing by the United States? 
If we agree that the program adopted by the Korean authorities has been 
successful, can it be exported to other countries? In assessing this, one issue 
stands out where the Korean experience appears exceptional. A common fea- 
ture of financial liberalization in other countries has been that, once initiated, 
it creates a momentum of its own. The British experience is instructive, al- 
though not unique. The abolition of capital controls allowed dis-intermediation 
from the domestic banking system to evade controls on the size of onshore 
banks’ balance sheets. Because they were essentially unenforceable, these di- 
rect controls were abolished. This allowed banks to expand their domestic ac- 
tivities, notably through aggressive entry into the market for mortgage loans. 
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The building societies (mutually owned thrifts) which had previously domi- 
nated the market for home loans were more strictly regulated than banks and 
thus felt they were subject to unfair competition-they demanded deregulation 
for themselves. Thus the process generated a self-sustaining momentum. 
How did the Korean authorities prevent these internal pressures for deregu- 
lation from emerging and maintain the gradualistic nature of the liberalization 
program? Presumably, the sequencing of reform is important. An important 
part of the British experience was the early abolition of capital controls, which 
was avoided in Korea. However, many countries have found administrative 
controls of the international movement of capital hard to implement once cur- 
rent account convertibility is established. For example, importers and exporters 
can manipulate the timing of trade invoicing and payments to generate sizable 
capital flows in the form of trade credit (which is exempt from restriction under 
the convertibility clause of IMF article VIII). 
Moreover, the paper describes in detail how the main effect of financial de- 
regulation thus far has been to expand the nonbank financial sector at the ex- 
pense (relatively) of the banking system. The latter remains much more heavily 
regulated than the former, putting it at a disadvantage in competing for funds. 
Why have the commercial deposit banks been content to tolerate the conse- 
quent erosion of market share? How have the Korean authorities been able to 
withstand the pressure from the banking system for deregulation to “level the 
playing field”? Only when these issues have been addressed will it be possible 
to assess whether the Korean gradualistic approach is genuinely applicable in 
other contexts. 
